The static and dynamic incidence of Vietnam's public safety net by Van de Walle, Dominique
WPs52?9 1
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2791
The Static and Dynamic  Vietnam's social welfare
programs  do not adequately
Incidence of Vietnam's  protect and promote the
Public Safety N et  poor.  Increased  spending,
with  better coverage and
targeting, could help poor
Dominique van de Walle  and vulnerable households.
The World Bank


















































































































dPOLIcy  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2791
Summary findings
How  does Vietnam's  public safety net affect outcomes  The author's analysis  shows that coverage  and
for the poor? Although social  welfare  programs in  payments  to households  are low and have had a
Vietnam are  centrally mandated,  they are locally  negligible  impact on poverty.  In principle, better
implemented  according to local  norms and local poverty  targeting could improve the impact of current outlays.
standards and often rely heavily on  local financing. Van  The analysis also shows that the system was ineffective  in
de Walle  examines the coverage,  incidence,  and  protecting households that were vulnerable  to shocks.
horizontal  equity of the programs that can be  identified  Finally,  the results suggest that although there  is a greater
in the data from the Vietnam Living Standards  Survey.  concentration  of poverty-related  programs and greater
She looks at the role of location  in determining whether  household  participation  in poorer communes,  the system
the poor are assisted nationally.  And she explores  spends more (absolutely  and relatively)  on the poor in
dynamic incidence  between  1993 and  1998 and the  richer communes.
degree  to which programs performed  a safety net
function.
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Viet Nam has a system of centrally determined  and mandated poverty and social
welfare programs that are implemented by local authorities according to local norms,
local poverty standards, and in large part, local financing.  Resources  are scarce.
Although they may be intended to cover the mandates, insufficient central and provincial
allocations may never even reach the communes.  These central allocations must
inevitably be supplemented by means of local resource mobilization.  There is evidence
that the rural population,  and the poor among them,  are heavily taxed including through
numerous locally levied  'fees, charges and other contributions'  (Government of Viet
Nam (GOV)-Donor Working Group 2000, Annex C).  In addition,  standards of "poverty"
used by different authorities vary across locations often simply mirroring local resources.
For these reasons, there is thought to be uneven coverage  and leakage.  The poorest in
Viet Nam often need to rely on charity from within their communities.  But the
communities they live in are often poor, so that other households  have little to spare.  In
this context too, it has been argued that coverage among Viet Nam's poor may be quite
uneven spatially, with poor people living in poor areas faring much worse than poor
people in well-off areas (Rao et al.  1999 and van de Walle  1999).
The decentralized  nature of Viet Nam's public safety net also raises wider
concerns from recent literature (Bardhan and Mookerjee 2000, Gallasso and Ravallion
2000, Conning and Kevane 1999).  A popular argument in recent years is that
decentralized programs  are better at reaching the poor.  The argument is essentially that
local authorities  are better placed to accurately identify and target poor people and their
problems.  Against that, counter arguments can also be made that local entities may not
1share the objectives of the central government and may be more liable to political
capture.  Arguments can clearly be made both ways.
In the light of these concerns - both specific  to Viet Nam and more general-
this paper examines how well targeted existing programs and expenditures  on poverty
reduction in Viet Nam are to poor communes and poor people. Surprisingly little is
known about this.  Cross-province regressions of budgetary allocations for health- and
education-related national programs strongly suggest that transfers from the center are
progressive in that they result in higher per capita spending in poor and middle income
provinces  (Fritzen 1999).  Fritzen also finds that central health transfers  are well targeted
based on health needs.  However,  little is known about the within province allocations to
districts and communes.  Others have noted the lack of cross-commune redistribution of
resources and the consequent  disparities between communes in their ability to provide
basic services and assistance to the local poor (Litvack 1999).  Moreover,  nationally
representative  data on household  specific program incidence has not been available for
more than one or two programs.  Fortunately new data from the 1997/98 Viet Nam
Living Standards Survey (VNLSS) enable an analysis of the incidence across households
and communes of some social welfare  and poverty-related  initiatives and provide an
opportunity to explore these concerns more rigorously.  The availability of an earlier data
set for 1992/93  also allows some comparisons  over time including longitudinal
comparison  for the same households.  There was more than a doubling of total spending
on certain transfers between the two dates.  This provides an interesting experiment  in
who benefited from the changes in outlays.
The main question the paper tries to address is whether current public social
2welfare programs  are targeted to the poor.2 In trying to answer this question, the paper
explores sensitivity to the definition of poverty and what is assumed about household
behavioral responses to the programs.  The paper exarnines whether programs perform a
safety net function - recognizing  that this involves both protection from poverty and
promotion from poverty (Dreze and Sen 1989).  The paper also examines  the role of non-
income factors, including whether equally poor communes in different provinces  are
treated equally and, if not, what accounts for these differences.
The next section discusses the setting, the overall system of poverty alleviation
and safety net programs and their financing.  Section 3 describes  the data, while section 4
discusses welfare measurement.  Implications for the incidence of program spending are
addressed in section 5.  Section 6 then looks at how much the system protects versus
promotes the poor.  The importance of factors other than welfare to incidence,  including
where one lives, is discussed in section 7.  Section 8 concludes.
2  Background
Despite experiencing  a large reduction in poverty since embracing the market
economy in the late  1980s, Viet Nam remains a poor country with more than one third of
its population in poverty.  Its population and poor are primarily rural, engaged in small-
scale agricultural activities  and subject to seasonality in incomes, recurring natural
disasters  and other important sources of vulnerability  and impoverishment.  Geographical
differences  and the existence of disadvantaged ethnic minority groups add to the
complexity of the poverty picture.  The country also faces  severe budget constraints.
2  The paper's focus  is on public transfers only.  For a discussion of private inter-household  transfers see
Cox (2001).
3Yet, on paper at least, Viet Nam has - by poor country standards - an extensive
social security and safety net system. This reflects  a strong historical commitment to
combating inequality and raising the living standards of all its regions and people.  The
surviving concern and frequently expressed political commitment to ensuring a minimum
level of welfare for all and maintaining  a low variance in incomes also does much to
preserve the regime's political legitimacy.  But the government's aspirations in this area
are often overshadowed by a lack of resources.
Doi Moi profoundly changed the way social services were delivered, leaving
peasants more vulnerable (Kolko  1997, Glewwe and Litvack  1998). Cooperatives that
had financed and supported health and education services for their members, as well as
insurance against shocks,  were disbanded in 1988.  The social protection system that has
evolved since decollectivization  is composed of a number of different initiatives that are
centrally mandated but locally implemented,  often relying heavily on local resources.3
The Social Security System provides pensions  and other employment-related  social
insurance payments to formal sector workers. Public servants and armed forces personnel
have been covered since  1947.  In 1995, the scheme was expanded to private sector
employees working in firms with  10 or more employees  (MOLISA 1999).  Although
these social insurance payments are employment-related  and eventually meant to be fully
funded from payroll taxes and employee contributions, they continue to be heavily
subsidized by the central budget.
The Social Guarantee  Fundfor Veterans and War Invalids extends compensation
and assistance in the form of social subsidy transfers to those who contributed  and
3 van de Walle (1999) provides more details.
4suffered from the war efforts - such as disabled veterans, relatives of dead soldiers,  and
others who contributed to the revolution.  The Social Guarantee  Fund  for Regular Relief
on the other hand targets  assistance to those unable to support themselves, including the
disabled, orphans and the elderly.  But, here especially, scarce public resources imply that
implementation  and coverage  ultimately depend in large part on local level governments
and resources.  The central government  also runs a Contingency Fundfor  Pre-Harvest
Starvation and Natural  Disasters  whose role is to minimize the consequences of natural
calamities and other emergencies  by dispensing disaster relief to regions and households:
Finally, the government has devised a number of National  Development Programs  that
aim to reduce poverty and are often targeted to 'poor and remote' communes.  These
include interventions  such as employment generation, reforestation, school and health fee
exemptions, micro-credit schemes and physical infrastructure  investments. Their focus is
generally more on promoting growth than on providing protection.
In 1996 the government also proposed a national hunger elimination and poverty
reduction (HEPR) program to coordinate existing and new efforts,  as well as the
resources  for combating poverty.  Since then many public programs have been
consolidated under the HEPR national poverty program in order to better mobilize and
coordinate antipoverty resources.  Within this, the government implemented the 'National
Target Program on Poverty Alleviation' between  1998 and 2000 and has recently
prepared a 'Poverty Alleviation Strategy'  for 2001-2010 (MOLISA 2001).  The HEPR
and these efforts do not appear, however, to have entailed much change in policy focus.
The policy areas have all been emphasized  in the past and addressed by past programs
and a variety of ad hoc schemes.  In addition, there is little new funding for HEPR from
5the center.  New poverty mandates and targets are imposed on ministries by HEPR
without the benefit of additional funding or reductions in other mandated responsibilities
(van de Walle  1999, Nguyen The Dzung,  1999).
Throughout these programs,  eligibility criteria, guidelines  and norns are largely
dictated by the center, while implementation is chiefly the responsibility of the
communes.  Poverty and needs are locally determined following national norms but
heavily influenced by available local means and resources.  Communes initially draw up
lists of eligible candidates for the different  social protection programs  to reflect their
needs.4 These are gathered, altered and eventually approved and passed on by the
districts and the provinces to the center.  Following a process of review and negotiation
between the Ministries of Finance (MOF), Planning and Investment (MPI)  and of Labor,
Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) in Hanoi, transfers are made to the provinces.
Although transfers from the central budget appear to be insufficient to cover local
needs or even centrally mandated  spending, there is evidence that they are quite
redistributive,  aiming to equalize resources across provinces  (Rao et al. 1999).  However,
use of the funds and intra-provincial  distribution are largely at the discretion of the
provincial authorities.  The evidence suggests that the redistributive process often breaks
down at this level (Litvack  1999). Provinces distribute resources to districts based on
criteria that vary widely from one province to another. And similarly,  districts distribute
to communes in disparate ways. Certainly, there is great disparity in the resources
available to communes.  Expenditure mandates are sometimes ignored and sometimes
funded from other recurrent transfers or locally mobilized resources ('contributions').
4 The lists are of people or households depending  on the program.
6There is often pressure on the communes to raise the resources to implement central
programs through charging various fees and levying 'voluntary contributions' from their
populations.  Communes are likely to contribute their own additional resources
depending on several factors including the economic status of households in the
commune,  and local leadership.  But it is likely that the most needy communes  are often
the ones that are least able to mobilize local funds.  Existing fiscal arrangements which,
at least for some programs, ensure progressive redistribution to poor provinces are,
nevertheless  likely to lead to low and uneven coverage  and horizontal inequity due to the
lack of central incentives or mandates for targeting the poor within provinces.  Statistics
published by MOLISA (1999) show the large gap between the numbers of eligible for
each of the social welfare programs and the actual numbers of beneficiaries. The
probability of participation is likely to depend on local budgets and leadership and hence,
on where one lives.
In exploring the implications for the poor of the existing safety net in Viet Nam,
this paper emphasizes a number of concerns.  One issue relates to defining 'the poor'.
The paper uses per capita consumption expenditures as its general welfare measure, but
recognizes that some components of the observed household consumption data reflect
public transfers.  This has implications  for drawing conclusions about the counterfactual
of what welfare would have been without transfers, and hence, about the incidence of
transfers. The paper describes  a method for dealing with this concern.
A second issue concerns how the safety net performed over time.  In principle,  a
safety net can reduce poverty either by protecting non-poor people from becoming poor
or by promoting poor people out of poverty.  How does Viet Nam's existing safety net
7perform in both functions?  With panel data, methods exist to address this question
(Ravallion et al.  1995). These methods  are applied to Viet Nam's safety net.
A final question concems possible determinants of program incidence other than
consumption expenditures.  One possibility is that interventions  are aimed at non-income
dimensions of welfare so that the incidence picture based on consumption gives a skewed
view of targeting.  Another possibility is that, given public institutional arrangements  for
delivering social welfare programs, one may find that non-welfare - in particular,
political and geographical - factors matter a great deal to whether transfers reach the
poor.  In this respect, it may not be poverty that attracts benefits but rather, the
characteristics  of the commune where one lives.  Communes in richer provinces will
generally have more resources for helping the poor.  To what degree is the interaction of
geography and low living standards the detemnining factor in whether the poor are
assisted nationally?
3  Data
The analysis is based on the nationally representative  1992/93 and 1997/98 Viet
Nam Living Standards Surveys (VNLSS).5 These are multi-topic household consumption
expenditure  surveys with modules covering numerous aspects of living standards.6  The
surveys covered 4800 households spread across  150 communes in 1993, and 6000
households living in  194 communes in 1998.  In both years, a community questionnaire
5The 1992/93  survey spanned a full year starting in October 1992, while the  1997/98  survey began in
December  1997 and lasted a year. For brevity's sake I will refer to the surveys as the  1993  and 1998
surveys respectively.
6 World Bank 1995 and 2000 provide detailed information on the surveys.  They are accessible at
www.worldbank.org/Isms/
8was administered in rural and small town communes  - 120 and 156 communes in the
respective years. A panel of 4308 households is also contained in the surveys.
The welfare indicator is annual per capita consumption.  This includes the value of
consumption from own production and the use value of consumer durables including
imputed housing expenditures (World Bank 1995  and 2000).  Consumption expenditures
and other monetary  amounts are expressed in real January 1998 national prices and
therefore take account both of inflation through the survey year and of spatial price
differences.  The 1998 survey sought to improve the measurement of consumption in
certain ways.  For example, it records the consumption of own-produced non-food items
such as coal, wood, and flowers and strives for a better accounting of tobacco
consumption.  Although some changes were introduced, the questionnaire  also ensured
that comparability across the two surveys would be feasible.  Two total consumption
expenditure measures - namely,  one which is the best possible measure for 1998 and
another which is made comparable to the  1993 expenditure totals - are therefore
available.  For all comparisons over time, the paper uses the temporally comparable
measures of consumption,  but sticks with the best  1998 measure otherwise.
The questionnaires  changed between the two surveys in certain other respects as
well. In particular, the 1998 survey contains considerably more information on
government programs and policies than the 1993  survey.  This puts certain limitations on
the types of issues that can be examined with respect to public interventions.  The only
transfer receipts recorded in 1993 for which a comparison can be made over time are
education scholarships,  social insurance and social subsidy funds. In 1998, details are
9also available on whether the household received transfers from the poverty alleviation
fund or NGOs.  In addition, there is information on the existence of programs and
numbers of beneficiaries  of various interventions at the commune level for 1998.  It
should be noted that there are a number of other ways in which the government
intervenes to increase social welfare - for example through subsidizing micro-credit and
various goods, and disaster relief (MOLISA 1999). Although information at commune
level for some such schemes (e.g. disaster relief) permits analysis of geographical reach,
an analysis of household level benefits is not feasible.
4  Behavioral  Responses  to Transfers
In assessing whether programs reach the poor,  a first step involves accurately
identifying the poor.  The aim is to determine what welfare would have been without the
government interventions.  Outcomes may depend on that choice: the appearance of weak
targeting may just be due to deficient welfare measurement.
Typically, studies of the incidence of public spending subtract the entire amount
of government transfer receipts from household income or consumption to approximate
pre-intervention welfare, and to rank the population into quintiles (say).  Netting transfers
out fully assumes that there is no replacement through savings, labor effort, schooling
decisions, inter-household  transfers and other potential  changes in household behavior.
That assumption is implausible.  Yet, treating post-transfer  consumption as the welfare
indicator instead, is just as problematic.  Ideally, one would like to subtract the
intervention amount but add in the replacement income households would have had had
they not benefited from the intervention.  van de Walle (2001)  addresses these concerns
10by estimating the marginal propensity to consume out of social income (PCSI) (also see
Ravallion et al.  1995).  The estimated PCSI is then used to determine the net gain to
consumption from social transfers and to construct the counterfactual  consumption level
without intervention.  This section summarizes the key results from van de Walle  (2001).
The estimate is then used for the paper's incidence  analysis.  In the following analysis,
transfers comprise  social insurance,  social subsidies and education scholarship receipts
-the  only components of social income that can be identified in both surveys.
Consumption of household i at time t (t1993, 1998)  (Cj,) is assumed to be
represented by an additive function of public transfers ( Ti, ), observed household
characteristics  (Xi,),  time varying ( 6,)  and time invariant (i7') latent factors:
Cit  = a  + /51, + rX,+ +  + a. +  (1)
There are a number of potential problems with estimating/i directly with this equation.
For example, transfers are likely to be correlated with time invariant household
characteristics (cov( Ti,  i7i )￿0),  such as if there is purposive targeting to the long term
poor.  Another possible source of endogeneity arises if transfers are correlated with time
varying determinants of consumption (cov(Ti,, 6  )0  or cov(Ti. sit)￿O).  This would occur
if transfers target those who suffered a shock.  Altematively, transfer eligibility may have
changed as a result of the death of a pension-receiving elderly household member.
Furthermore,  such changes may not all be observed in the data.  Finally, the behavioral
response, and hence the PCSI, may well vary across households with different household
characteristics.
A number of alternative specifications  are run to test for these possibilities.  A
11double differencing model where all variables are expressed in first differences is used to
purge the estimate of fixed effects  and deal with the first source of endogeneity.
Equation (1) is then:
ACi, =  6ATL,  + yAXi,  + A5,  + Aei,  (2)
Since there are only two rounds of data, the term  A6, becomes an ordinary intercept term
in a regression of the change in consumption on the change in transfers.  This regression
was initially run assuming that yAX,  = 0 (characteristics don't change or don't have any
effect), giving the standard "double difference"  estimate of the consumption impact of
transfers.  This gives a,6 estimate of 0.45 with a heteroscedasticity  and clustering-
corrected t-statistic of 4.3 (van de Walle 2001).  To deal with potential remaining
contamination through dependence of the change in transfers on time varying
characteristics, a regression  is run that controls for changes  in observable household
characteristics  in the double difference model of consumption  as a function of transfers.
A number of variables are found to be significant - changes in household size and in
the language of interview have a negative impact, while an older head and a higher
educational  level influence consumption positively.7 The ,8 estimate is 0.37 (t=3.6), and
not significantly different  from the initial simple double difference  estimate.
To deal with possible omitted variables that alter over time and affect transfers,
the last OLS is re-estimated with the change in transfers instrumented by transfer receipts
7The regression controls for changes  in household size and composition - in particular,  the number of
members in the 0 to 6 and 7 to 16 age groups,  the number of women and men over 55 and 60 respectively
(the formal sector legal retirement age) - a change in the highest grade completed by the most educated
member of the household,  the change in the age and gender of the household head and finally a change in
the language of interview. Households had the option of being interviewed in a language other than the
majority Kinh in both survey years. See van de Walle (2001)  for full regression results and explanation.
12in the first period.8 This gives an estimated,8  of 0.72 (t=3.7). This is higher, but still not
statistically significantly different from the first, naive estimate.
van de Walle (2001) also tests for heterogeneity in impacts by adding interactions
between the change in transfers and household characteristics  to the OLS regression with
controls for time varying changes in characteristics.  The results suggest that the impact
of transfers on consumption is higher in more educated households. However,  a test of
the joint significance of the interaction terms shows them not to be significantly different
from zero.
The analysis in van de Walle (2001)  suggests a range of estimates of the PCSI
none of which are significantly different from the simple double difference estimate of
0.5.  So, in the following analysis,  consumption expenditures  are net of half of the value
of transfer receipts that can be identified, unless otherwise noted.9"1 0
5  Incidence  of Poverty-Related  Programs
The paper now turns to evidence from the 1998 VNLSS on the incidence of
programs and policies aimed at raising living standards.  The focus is squarely on the
distributional impacts and who's getting how much.  In reality, these programs serve
noted other objectives - such as assisting those who contributed to and suffered from the
8 A high correlation is found between these variables  (0.50). The key untestable exclusion restriction is that
transfers  in 1993  do not appear on the right hand side of the equation (i.e. cov(si,, Ti,  ) = 0).  This appears
plausible but would not hold if, say, the initial level of transfers helps prevent households from falling into
destitution or succeeds in putting them on a different growth path. There is no obvious other instrument
with which to do an over-identification  test.
9 Note that this means half of the total of scholarships,  social insurance and subsidy funds for 1992/93  and
half that same total plus poverty alleviation and NGO funds for 1998.
10  The lower the PCSI, the more targeted transfers  appear to be to the poor.  See van de Walle (2001)  for a
discussion.
13war effort or the elderly - that one may want to take into account when assessing
whether to expand or contract them.  At the same time, it is often argued that there is a
coincidence of objectives and that some of the larger Funds - particularly social
subsidies - are quite pro-poor.  Substantial public resources are spent on these programs
and while poverty may not be their sole objective,  it is important to ask how much is
reaching the poor.
In Table 1, individuals are ranked into national population quintiles on the basis
of their household per capita expenditures - net of half of current transfer receipts  as
discussed in section 4.11  The table presents real monetary amounts per capita of various
types of public transfers received by households  during the 12 months prior to the survey.
Amounts are expressed averaged over each quintile's population-  recipient  and non-
recipient. Percentages of the population living in households where at least one member
benefited from these transfers are given in Table 2.  In general,  outlays are small and
there is weak coverage.12
The largest payments are from the social insurance fund, covering pension and
disability benefits for civil servants and SOE employees.  As a result, one would expect
these payments to be more widespread in urban areas and not to be particularly pro-poor.
They are predominant  in urban areas where  18.3 percent of the population live in
households where someone received these payments in 1998 (Table 2). Yet, per capita
amounts from this source are by far largest for the poor in urban areas.  In rural areas, by
contrast, the amounts received rise steadily with levels of living. This program also
I I I will refer to these as net quintiles.
12 The official January  1998  exchange  rate was about VND12,290 to the US dollar.
14touches the greatest number of people of any program (11.2 percent nationally).
Social subsidies, which include payments to veterans and the families of war
martyrs, as well as to those unable to support themselves, are much smaller in absolute
amounts.  These programs are often claimed to be reaching the poor in Viet Nam.  Per
capita amounts  are largest for those in the poorest quintile in urban areas.  In rural areas,
the poorest quintile follows the top quintile with the second largest per capita amounts.
In general, receipts  are much more even across expenditure levels than for social
insurance benefits.  Interestingly, mean payments are larger in rural areas, though
coverage  is relatively similar across the sectors.
Actual individual social insurance  and subsidy payments are found to vary widely
across recipient households.  For example,  social insurance outlays range from 49,252 to
21,500,000 and social subsidy outlays from 14,264 to 8,645,464 Dongs per year.  It
should be noted that some of this variance  is expected.  For one, the survey does not
allow identification of recipients.  Some households may have more than one beneficiary.
Furthermore,  social insurance payments  consist of pensions but also disability payments
which are likely to be lower than the former.  Government- set minimum Regular Relief
transfers  also vary across the different types of potential beneficiaries  (MOLISA  1999).
The survey also asked about transfers received under policies or programs
supported by the government's  education scholarship program,  its poverty alleviation
efforts,  and transfers received from NGOs. Few scholarships  are awarded (141 were
reported in the sample).  Their incidence is regressive: the top quintile has the largest
share of recipients  as well as the highest per capita amounts in both rural and urban areas.
However, the urban population in the bottom quintile is also notable for having the
15second highest incidence of beneficiaries.  In general, scholarships benefit a larger share
of the urban than rural population.  Per capita amounts are also higher in urban areas.
The amounts involved in the poverty alleviation and NGO funds are negligible:
equivalent to approximately $0.22 per person per year (1998 official exchange rate) in the
case of poverty alleviation funds and $0.08 from NGOs for the quintile with the largest
receipts. The little money there is appears to be moderately well-targeted in rural areas, in
that per capita amounts fall with higher quintiles.  However, there is also evidence of
capture by the well-off since all quintiles get something.  This is more pronounced in
urban areas for both poverty and NGO transfers.
Finally, expressing all transfers together as a share of household per capita
expenditures indicates progressive overall incidence  in both rural and urban areas.'3
Transfers to the urban poor in the bottom national quintile  account for 35 percent of their
consumption - quite a contrast with the poorest in rural areas for whom transfers
account for 7.3 percent. Nonetheless,  it is clear that income from social welfare programs
account for only a small percentage of consumption expenditures overall.
The low average amounts received from social welfare in Table 1 could reflect
either low coverage or low monetary amounts among those covered.  Table 2 provides
information on percentages of the population in each sub-group whose household
received social welfare transfers (as discussed in Table  1).  The patterns across quintiles
are what one would expect following the discussion of Table 1. Only 2.2% of the
population (2.6 and 0.8% of the rural and urban populations respectively)  belong to
households who received assistance  under a poverty program.  This rises to a maximum
13  Note that throughout the paper I am defining progressive to mean that as a proportion of expenditures,
transfers  decline as expenditures increase.
16of  6.6% for the poorest rural quintile.  These figures may well underestimate  the coverage
of poverty programs if households do not know the source of assistance.  Nevertheless,
the data suggest very limited coverage.  Table 3 further shows the urban bias of spending
on these programs.  Although only 22 percent of the population and less than 6 percent of
the poor lived in urban areas in 1998, 46 percent of total spending goes to urban areas.
One important initiative under the education-related  national programs has been
targeted exemptions  from paying school fees and other contributions.  Such exemptions
appear to be received by children attending all levels of education,  but most commonly
primary, followed by secondary,  schooling.  Since primary school fees were abolished in
1993 (Behrman and Knowles  1999), the exemptions being picked up by the VNLSS98
and received by primary school kids must cover other school expenditures. Table 4
presents percentages of the population living in households with at least one child
benefiting from exemptions  across quintiles, as well as the reasons given for being
exempted.  Unfortunately,  the data do not allow a calculation of the pecuniary benefit of
the fee discharges.  Exemptions can be partial or total.  In the VNLSS sample,  there were
only 862 households who had at least one recipient child, though many had more than
one.  One thousand children benefited from partial exemptions and 571  from total
exemptions.  In both urban and rural areas, more partial than total exemptions are
bestowed - 3.7% versus 2. 1% of the rural population and 1.8% versus 0.7% of the
urban.  There are clear indications that total exemptions are better targeted than partial
ones.  This can also be seen in the reasons  given for receiving the exemption.  Of the
reasons listed in the questionnaire,  unspecified 'other' is the most commnon for partial
exemptions in both urban and rural areas (see below for further explanation).  This is
17followed by living in a remote or mountainous region and having a parent who is a
disabled soldier or cadre in rural areas, and the latter and being poor in urban areas.  In
contrast, living in a remote or mountainous region is the most commonly given reason for
receiving the total exemption in rural areas, followed by being from an ethnic minority
and poor.  In urban areas, poverty is given as the main reason and is given as a reason
across all quintiles.  For example, 35% of exemptions received in the fourth quintile give
poverty as the reason.  Targeting exemptions to the children of disabled soldiers or cadres
primarily benefits the richest groups in both sectors.  However, 33% of all reasons in
rural and 43% in urban areas were given as  'other."1 4
Table 4 shows the incidence of school fee exemptions to be mildly pro-poor.
Similar conclusions  are reached when the incidence is instead expressed across the
percentage  of children  6 to  14 across consumption quintiles (p.145, GOV-Donor
Working Group 2000). However,  as noted by Behrman and Knowles (1999)  school fees
account for only a small share of total school-related expenditures and have a negligible
impact on poverty outcomes.
Households in Viet Nam are expected to make cash or in kind contributions  to a
myriad number of funds, associations  and national causes. Table 5 provides some
information about average household per capita annual contributions to their commune's
labor and local security and police funds,  and to mass associations. These are the funds
for which the household survey collected information, but represent just some among the
many payments households make.  Such funds collect fees that are earmarked for
14 Other (not individually recorded) reasons for receiving  exemptions included: being a student at a
pedagogic college; being an excellent student, a class monitor, the children of teachers,  the children of
officers and workers for whom tuition is paid for by the parent's work; and households with 2 or more
children attending school (GSO communication).
18particular services.  For example, contributions to the labor fund can be made in labor
time, cash or kind and are intended to finance road maintenance and small construction
works in the commune.  With the exception of the labor fund in rural areas, absolute
amounts generally rise with levels of living for all categories.  As a share of household
expenditures they are still moderately regressive for the rural population but they are
income neutral for the urban population at a consistent  0.4% of expenditures across
quintiles.  Strikingly, more is paid per capita by all but the top quintile in rural areas. This
is driven by much higher contributions  to the labor fund by the rural population.
A much larger percentage of the population makes contributions to one of the
three funds (for which there is self-reported information) than benefit from social welfare
income.  In rural areas, this varies from 70% of the population, to 54 and 49 for the labor
fund,  security fund and associations respectively. Compulsory contributions of 10 labor
days a year for able-bodied  adults within a certain age range has been a long time
tradition in Viet Nam. With the introduction of the market economy,  the labor
contribution has been partly or fully replaced by a cash or in-kind contribution in some
regions.  A national ordinance specifies the money amounts to be paid for each work day
and details a number of characteristics  that exempt individuals either temporarily or
permanently.  The  1998 VNLSS asked the household both about the time given in labor
and the cash and in kind payments made by family members during the last year. The
data, as well as other sources suggest that there is liberal interpretation of the national
ordinance at local level.  For example, a study of 6 communes in 3 provinces found the
time obligation to vary between  10 and 15  days and the cash alternative to be between
VND 3,400 to 10,000 per day  (GOV-Donor Working Group 2000, Annex C).  The
19evidence thus suggests that the cash amounts paid in lieu of labor time are considerably
lower than daily wage rates on average.  Imputing a labor time cash value by using mean
commune-specific level agricultural  and non-agricultural  unskilled wages will tend to
overestimate  the labor contributions.' 5 Short of going to every commune, it is impossible
to know how the policy is enforced for each household.  Below, I use what appears to be
reasonable, if an upper bound, estimates of 10,000  and 15,000 dongs per day for rural and
urban areas respectively.
Imputed labor time is added to the cash and in kind contributions to give the total
payments to the labor fund presented in Table 5. Participation in the labor fund decreases
with increasing living standards in rural areas.  The picture is quite different in urban
areas.  In all quintiles  a smaller percentage contribute to the labor fund than in rural areas
and participation  rises with expenditures from 25% of the poorest to 42% of the top
quintile. A large percentage contribute to local security (59% overall)  and the more so the
higher the quintile.  57% of the urban population also contributed to associations  over the
last year.  For these contributory "funds" coverage  appears reasonably wide, though
average amounts contributed among those contributing are clearly low.  As noted
however,  the charges reviewed account for just part of the amounts levied from
households.  A recent study suggests that in aggregate they can be quite burdensome  as a
share of household expenditures.  Conversely,  they clearly play a crucial role in
commune level budgets (GOV-Donor Working Group 2000, Annex  C).
Tables 6 and 7 combine data from the household  and commune surveys to present
percentages of the rural and small-town populations classified into poor/non-poor groups,
5 For example, commune  mean daily unskilled agricultural wages in real  1998 prices are 19,421  and
16,609 dongs for men and women respectively.
20by whether i) they live in communes where any of seven public programs are currently
active (poverty alleviation, employment generation, environmental/clean  water, public
health, infrastructure  development,  education/culture,  or other); ii) whether the commune
received disaster relief in the last year;  iii) and whether any physical infrastructure  was
built or improved  during the last three years and what type.16
Poverty programs  are the most common.  These were active at the time of the
survey in communes covering  80% of the population and 84% of the poor.  However,
they were slightly more common in small towns where 83% of the entire population, and
86% of the poor, were covered.  Employment generation, sanitation and clean water, and
education and culture projects also reached a larger proportion of small town residents
than rural ones.  By contrast, public health and infrastructure  development programs
covered more of the rural population.  Disaster relief was also received  in communes
covering 65% of the non-urban population.  Finally, infrastructure  investments are
extremely widespread covering communes  containing 92% of the rural, and 78% of the
small town populations.  In both sectors, roads and schools are the most common
investments.  In rural communes, both tend to benefit larger percentages  of the better-off.
In the programs reviewed in Tables 6 and 7 there is some evidence of targeting
the poorer population groups.  Disaster relief, for example, is received by the communes
of a greater percentage of poor than non-poor households. However, based on these data,
it is not possible to judge whether relative to needs, disaster relief would still appear well-
targeted.  Many of the other programs are thought to be geographically targeted to
government-identified  'poor and remote'  communes.  Yet, on the whole the impression is
16 Here and elsewhere,  the paper uses the national poverty lines described in Glewwe et al. (2000).
21one of programs being spread widely across  expenditure groups and the rural population
generally.  This may reflect problems in identifying the poor through the current 'poor
and remote'  commune classification, corroborating the results of Minot and Baulch
(2001).  It could also indicate that communes  are heterogeneous in terms of levels of
living and that geographical targeting may be an inefficient way to help the poor.  Of
course, these tabulations tell us nothing about the magnitude or impact of the programs.
Careful evaluation of Viet Nam's various poverty program disbursements  must be
made to better understand what does and does not work.  However, the data reviewed
both at household and commune level suggests a government preference  for programs
that are community-based  rather than targeted to households.  Transfers to households  are
negligible and coverage is weak.  By contrast, the data indicate substantial community
based programs and investments.  Again, how much is being spent is unclear, as is the
impact of the latter programs.  However, as assessed by incidence across per capita
expenditure quintiles, such interventions appear to be only weakly targeted to Viet Nam's
poor. The data suggest that transfers are redistributive,  but not particularly well targeted
in that, in general,  the poor receive less in absolute amounts than the non-poor.
6  Protection versus promotion
As can be seen in Table 8, there was a clear expansion in the total outlays going to
social welfare programs between  1993  and 1998.17 As reported in the survey, mean
overall real per capita amounts rose from 51,443 to 116,641  dongs in  1998 prices, a 127
17 Note that this refers only to programs-scholarships,  social insurance and social subsidies-covered in
both VNLSSs. Although these do not account for all programs,  they cover the bulk of social income
receipts.
22percent proportionate  increase.
Was this expansion pro-poor? A comparison of panel households over time can
help answer this and other pertinent questions concerning the performance of the safety
net.  An important role for the public sector in a poor rural economy like Viet Nam is to
provide protection for those who are vulnerable to poverty due to uninsured shocks.  The
preceding incidence picture is uninformative  about whether transfers perform such a
safety net function.  The static incidence may not seem particularly well-targeted, but it
may be deceptive about the degree to which outlays, coverage,  and changes over time,
were perhaps correlated to poverty related shocks and changes in exogenous variables.
We have already seen the considerable variability in payment amounts across recipients.
There is also much instability over time in who gets transfers.  For example, out of a total
of 744 and 769 panel households who respectively got social insurance or social subsidy
outlays in one of the two years, only 402 and  111  got them in both years. Does this reflect
a response to changing household circumstances  on the part of  the system?  This section
examines  social welfare incomes from this perspective.
When using the panel to study the incidence of the changes in social income,
there is a question of how one should rank households in deciding who is 'poor'.  Table 8
ranks households by three different definitions of welfare, which can be loosely referred
to as denoting the initial, new, and long-term poor - namely per capita expenditures (net
of half of transfers)  in the initial period, the same in the later period and by the mean over
both years - and presents a comparison of mean per capita social income receipts in
both years.  The proportional gains  from expansion were pretty uniform across groups.
However,  among the 'poor' in each of the three senses, the 'initial poor' clearly had the
23lowest gains with a 122% proportionate increase in benefits for the bottom quintile and a
131%  increase for the second lowest.  The 'new poor' had the highest proportionate gains
(137%  and 155%  increase respectively),  while the 'long-term poor' fall somewhere  in
between (130% and 139%).  Per capita amounts increased for all groups but the share of
the population receiving  transfers declined slightly overall (22 to 20 percent), as did the
proportion of the poor receiving them by all three definitions.  The evidence does not
suggest that the poor were targeted by the program expansion.
Were changes in transfers responsive to poverty-related  shocks?  Table 9 presents
information on mean changes in transfers received by panel households classified into a
three by three matrix.  Households  ranked into terciles of their initial  1992/93 level of per
capita consumption (low, middle or high) are cross-tabbed against the change in their
consumption between the two dates categorized into whether it underwent a fall, stayed
more or less the same or rose significantly.'8 So, for example, 34 percent of those who
were in the bottom third of the distribution in 1992/93  and experienced a fall in
consumption over time, received transfers equal to about 111,901  dongs per person in
recipient households.
There is little sign that the system responded to consumption shocks.  Indeed, the
percentage of households  who benefited  from social incomes is relatively uniform across
cells.  Neither starting out poor, nor experiencing negative consumption shocks, appear to
have elicited a response from social welfare programs. 32 percent of those who enjoyed
the highest initial consumption and the highest gains to consumption were beneficiaries
18 Consumption in 1993  is net of half of transfers,  while changes  in consumption are net of half the change
in transfers.
24compared to 34 percent of the worst off in both respects.  Furthermore,  if anything, the
per capita transfers to participants increase with initial and rising welfare.  The smallest
amount went to the most needy. These specific programs appear unresponsive to shocks.
As discussed in section 2 (and to be further discussed in section 7), location may
be an important factor in the determination of program participation.  Possibly the
absence of a pattern in Table 9 arises from variation across geographical  areas that is
obscuring patterns within them. To test this, a dummy variable indicating whether
transfers were received in  1998 was regressed against initial (1993) per capita
consumption and the change in per capita consumption (1993 to 1998).  A linear
probability model was used and run with and without commune effects.  With commune
effects, there is no sign of transfers responding either to initial consumption or to changes
in consumption.  Without commune effects, the results suggest that transfers respond
perversely to initial consumption (,8 =1. 12e-8,  t=2.52) and not to shocks (similarly to
Table 9).  This suggests that it is households in richer communes that primarily benefit
from these transfers.
It is of further interest to examine what role transfers played in the impressive
reduction in poverty that occurred over this period.  The panel structure  is now exploited
to evaluate how well the safety net performed dynamically including how well it
protected against poverty distinguished from how well it promoted out of poverty,
following the approach proposed in Ravallion,  van de Walle and Gautam (1995).  In
comparing joint distributions of consumption expenditures,  such as with and without
policy changes, the approach tests a policy's ability to protect the poor (PROT) and its
25ability to promote the poor (PROM).1 9 It indicates which distribution offered more
protection and which offered more promotion and allows a calculation of the statistical
significance of the difference.
Table 10 presents the baseline joint distribution of consumption in the two years.
Households are classified into four groups according to whether they were poor or non-
poor in both years, and whether they escaped or fell into poverty over the period. There is
evidence of a large fall in poverty: 26 percent of the population escaped poverty, 5
percent fell into poverty,  34 percent were persistently poor and 35 percent were never
poor.  There is considerable persistent poverty.
What is the effect of transfers on poverty?  To answer this question, it is necessary
to simulate the counterfactual joint distribution without transfers; as in the static
incidence calculations, this is done by subtracting half the transfers received in each
respective year from consumption in that year.  The simulated joint distribution is given
in Table  11.  Transfers are found to have negligible impact on poverty.  Without them,
one and two additional percent of the population would have been poor in 1993 and 1998
respectively.  The measures of promotion and protection are not statistically significantly
different from zero.  Table 12 simulates the joint distribution had there been no changes
in transfers between the two dates.  The change  in the proportion who fell into poverty
identifies the degree of protection offered while the change in the proportion who
escaped poverty indicates promotion.  Changes enabled just over one percentage of  the
population to escape poverty, while they protected  about one percent from falling into
poverty. Again,  these are not statistically different from zero effect. Low spending,  low
9 Details on the tests are given in Ravallion  et al.  (1995) and van de Walle (2001).
26coverage and poor targeting together explain the negligible impact of transfers and
changes in transfers on poverty.
How much could better targeting improve impacts  on poverty incidence?  Table
13 compares  the current distribution relative to a simulated uniform  allocation of actual
1998 social income across the entire population.  This would have a small, but
statistically significant further impact on poverty:  an additional 3 percent of the
population (7 percent of the poor) under the actual allocation would escape poverty
(s.e.=0.4%).  Just over two percent of the non-poor would have fallen into poverty
(s.e.=0.3%).  What if 1998 transfers were instead targeted based on an equal allocation to
those below the poverty line only? The results in Table  14 show that outlays would be
sufficient to bring 17 percent of the poor (7% of the population with a standard error of
estimate of 0.4%) out of poverty.  Only 3 percent of the non-poor would have fallen into
poverty(2 % of the population, s.e.=0.2%).
Finally,  going back to the concerns of Table 8, Table  15 presents the joint
distribution of the incidence of proportionate gains in social incomes.  When ranked by
their 1998 welfare,  large gains are again apparent for the non-poor.  The new information
here is that within the non-poor,  the largest gains went to those who were initially poor.
Once again,  the evidence suggests very poor performance on protection.
Poverty fell quite dramatically in Viet Nam between  1992/93 and 1998, but social
insurance, social subsidy and scholarship income transfers appear to have had negligible
bearing on that outcome.  Nor did they fulfill a safety net role in protecting those who
faced falling living standards during this period.  Part of the reason is low overall
spending on these programs.  However, the simulations above suggest that poor targeting
27is a fundamental problem, as are low total outlays.
7  Geographic  Targeting
One possible explanation  for the picture that has emerged so far may be the
narrowness of the welfare indicator that has been used.  Consumption expenditures per
capita may simply be too narrow a welfare metric to reveal the underlying pro-poor
targeting.  Programs may well respond to on-the-ground  definitions of welfare that are
considerably more complex than per capita consumption.
Another possible explanation is that, given Viet Nam's institutional arrangements
for delivering social welfare programs, non-welfare dimensions,  such as politico-
geographical dimensions,  may largely determine whether transfers reach the
disadvantaged.  This section explores these possibilities.
Poor communes have greater needs but richer communes  can better afford
poverty-related programs.  The latter may also be better at implementing programs and
reaching their poor. One means of equalizing resources is through the central
government's national programs.  An obvious question is to what degree redistribution
occurs through these programs.  Are the limited resources transferred  from the national
programs to the local level targeted to poorer communes?  It is not possible to answer this
directly since there is no way to figure out whether a sampled household benefits from a
national program from the VNLSS (with the exception of school fee exemptions  for
which a benefit amount is not identifiable).  However, incidence at commune level is
observed in the commune  level data for employment generation, poverty alleviation,
education and culture,  infrastructure development,  public health, environment and other
28programs; similarly, household participation at commune level is observed for micro-
credit, school and health fee exemptions, tax exemptions, training and disaster relief
programs.  Most of these programs are probably centrally mandated 'national programs',
although they can not be identified specifically. Table  16 links the household and
commune level data to show the incidence of programs  and of beneficiary households
across communes classified into three equal groups - poor, middle and rich - by the
mean per capita consumption expenditures of their population as sampled in the
household  survey.
Are poor communes more likely to have poverty programs?  Table  16 suggests
that the answer is yes.  In general, poorer communes appear to have both more poverty
related programs and a greater share of their populations participating.  But the exceptions
are interesting. The percent of households benefiting from occupational  training is
highest in rich communes.  Education, employment generation,  and environmental
programs are all most common in the richest communes.  There appears to be capture of
skills and employment related schemes  in richer communes perhaps because they are
already well-endowed with the benefits offered by the other programs.  Overall, the
incidence across communes  is redistributive in that there is a greater concentration  of
programs in the poorest communes.  However, it is also true that programs are spread
around quite widely geographically.20
The above results tell us nothing about the benefits to households from living in a
20 Again, the empirical evidence does not support the claim that truly poor communes  are being targeted
much more so than others.  This could reflect deficiencies  in the government's  identification of poor
communes  (see Minot and Baulch 2001), or point to the inefficiency of geographical  targeting due either to
fundamental heterogeneity  among communes or alternatively,  to targeting not actually being implemented.
29commune with a program or from being among the beneficiaries.  For this we need to
turn to household level data. Linking up household  and commune information further
allows an exploration of the importance of geographical location to participation  in
programs. For example, how do the poor in poorer communes  fare compared to the poor
in richer communes?  To what degree does a poor household's geographical  location
determine whether and how much it benefits from assistance programs?  Do poor
households  in rich communes do better than in poor communes?  Are there  signs of better
targeting when more is spent overall in a location (see Ravallion 1999).  Tables  17 and 18
attempt to examine these issues by looking at the distribution  of beneficiaries and of
social income payments (as reported at the household level) across the populations of
poor, middle and rich communes ranked into national terciles of per capita consumption
net of transfers.
Table 18 clearly shows that, not only is more being spent per capita overall in
richer communes, but much more is also going to the poor.  Total mean per capita
payments in the richest communes are more than double that in the poorer communes.
Mean per capita amounts going to the poor are 136 percent higher. There are signs of
better targeting in better-off communes.  Social insurance and social subsidies largely
drive these results.  Although Table  17 indicates that more of the poor live in households
that participate in programs in poor communes than in rich communes, the per capita
amounts received by the poor in the latter dwarf the former.  They account for 7.1 percent
of household expenditures compared to 4.3 for the bottom tercile in the poorest
communes.  Although small, outlays from the poverty alleviation fund tend to be
concentrated in poor communes and on the poorest.  The targeting differential, given by
30the difference between the mean expenditures  going to the poorest 50 percent of the
population to that going to the top 50 percent are  1202,  1210 and  161  for poor, middle
and rich communes respectively.
8  Conclusions  and Policy  Implications
The paper's results reveal little sign of targeting to poor people or poorer
communes in terms of their levels of living measured by consumption.  If anything,
transfer receipts rise with consumption per person, though there are signs that the share of
social incomes in consumption falls with consumption, implying that transfers reduce
inequality.  Nor is the existing system effective in protecting households who are
vulnerable to falling living standards.  Household payments  and contributions  also appear
to be regressive.
The current system suffers from the lack of national norms for identifying the
poor consistently across regions;  the lack of survey and other instruments with which to
consistently measure and monitor local needs and program performance;  a lack of
integration and coordination between sub-programs  with well-defined and universal rules
for implementation at the local level; insufficient welfare maximizing redistribution of
resources across space so that everyone is treated equally regardless of where they reside;
and a lack of resources and attention to helping households and communities deal with
covariate risk. Progress in these areas could lead to significant improvement  in social
protection for Vietnam's poor and vulnerable households.
In terms of funding and priorities, it is clear that the primary focus of HEPR
continues to be micro-finance  and infrastructure development.  The potential immediate
31significance  of the HEPR lies in the possibility of greater consistency in priorities and
norms, better monitoring of outcomes, much needed integration and coordination
between programs, better coverage of the poor, and redistribution towards poorer and less
administratively capable provinces. But, here too, there has been little discernible
progress since the HEPR's inception.
While the HEPR concept offers the potential for significant improvements  in the
safety net, the Government of Vietnam faces a number of difficult challenges.  The very
principles on which the current highly decentralized, community-based  assistance and
safety net system is built are threatened by the emerging market economy.  In particular,
increasing mobility - important to a well-functioning market system - dictates a
thorough rethinking of the safety net's foundations.  Household mobility renders
community level identification  and targeting of the poor less effective  and is likely to
make the mobilization of community resources  for helping the poor more difficult.  The
high level of decentralization inhibits the country's ability to provide adequate protection
from covariate risks, which, in turn, appear to be on the rise as a result of environmental
destruction.  Adequately addressing this challenge, and the consequently widening urban-
rural and regional inequalities, will require a greater level of risk pooling nationally
through greater reliance on state-contingent redistribution mediated through the center.
Important political hurdles can also be expected  in efforts aimed  at reallocating resources
to better protect Vietnam's poor and vulnerable.
Geographic targeting is a widespread practice and is generally assumed to work
well when there are geographical concentrations of poverty and identification of the poor
is possible at sufficiently disaggregated  level.  However,  it may well be that poorer areas
32are less capable of reaching their poor well and /or implementing poverty programs than
their richer counterparts.  The paper finds that across Viet Nam's communes,  more is
spent relatively and absolutely on the poor in richer communes.  This is likely to reflect
the large differences  in resources across regions.  More research is needed to understand
whether it also reflects weaker capacity  for reaching the poor.  However, in the absence
of a reform of the fiscal redistributive  system - whereby the center's redistributive
process promotes  an equalization of resources all the way to the commune level - if one
is asking where resources will have the greatest impact, it is not clear that one should not
target better off communes rather than poorer ones.
The data do not allow us to identify whether funding comes from the national  or
local levels.  Past evidence seems to indicate  that existing national resources are
relatively well targeted spatially at provincial level, but that the redistributive effect is
mitigated by the distribution that then occurs within provinces.  Although the paper
cannot throw light on this question, it does show that the combination of funding and
implementation mechanisms results in poor areas and people getting less than better-off
areas and people.  This suggests the need for more compensatory mechanisms  from the
center which could take the form of more money, better incentives for fiscal
redistribution at the local level, more monitoring of central norms or administrative
constraints on local discretion in the implementation of centrally mandated social welfare
programs.
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35Table 1: Incidence of social welfare income  (dongs peryear  per capita  and as a percent of household  per capita expenditures)
National  No.  of  Social  Social  Education  Poverty  NGO Income  Total  Social Welfare Income
population  households  insurance fund  subsidies  scholarships  alleviation income
Net quintile  dongs per capita  dongs per  dongs per  dongs per capita  dongs per capita  dongs per capita  % of h'hold
capita  capita  expenditures
1  937  69,506  22,785  1,158  2,652  1,030  97,130  8.3
2  1,001  67,883  17,021  772  1,600  508  87,785  5.2
3  1,165  98,543  17,556  1,856  607  338  118,901  5.4
4  1,319  109,339  17,503  2,806  829  286  130,764  4.4
5  1,576  140,439  18,337  7,912  654  443  167,785  3.1
total  5,998  97,145  18,639  2,901  1,268  521  120,474  5.3
Rural
Net quintile
1  887  57,947  21,649  1,058  2,707  1,071  84,431  7.3
2  917  58,712  17,237  817  1,721  546  79,032  4.7
3  997  73,569  17,437  1,411  398  384  93,199  4.2
4  973  80,694  18,862  2,823  444  373  103,195  3.5
5  607  92,885  23,625  6,011  116  0  122,638  2.5
total  4,381  69,697  19,340  1,944  1,249  546  92,776  4.8
Urban
Net quintile
1  50  357,704  51,106  3,642  1,296  0  413,747  34.6
2  84  189,868  14,148  185  0  0  204,200  12.4
3  168  281,715  18,431  5,126  2,140  0  307,411  14.1
4  346  203,987  13,015  2,752  2,104  0  221,858  7.4
5  969  174,381  14,562  9,269  1,037  760  200,010  3.4
total  1,617  201,095  15,981  6,527  1,341  425  225,369  7.3
Source:  1998 VNLSS
Note: The rural/urban breakdown  follows the urban92 definition. Individuals  are ranked into national population quintiles based on household per capita
expenditures net of half of transfers receipts. The amounts represent household self-reported  income received from the government during the last year expressed
on a per capita basis across the population of each quintile.  Social insurance refers to pensions and disability payments.  Social subsidies  consist of transfers to
families of war martyrs, disabled veterans, and from social organizations  or production  facilities.  These come from the Social Guarantee Fund for Veterans and
War Invalids and the Social Guarantee Fund for Regular Relief The poverty alleviation income represents  all funds received from programs associated with the
government's poverty alleviation policy. NGO income is assistance received from private and intemational NGOs.
36Table 2: Incidence  of social welfare income  (% ofpopulation)
National  % of population living in households  who  received:
population
Net Quintile  Social  Social  Education  Poverty  NGO
insurance  subsidies  scholarships  alleviation  income
1  9.5  11.6  1.1  6.4  0.5
2  9.1  9.4  0.8  2.1  1.2
3  11.6  9.6  1.9  1.3  0.3
4  12.1  10.0  2.7  0.9  0.2
5  13.9  7.3  5.6  0.2  0.1
total  11.2  9.6  2.4  2.2  0.5
Rural
Net Quintile
1  8.7  11.5  0.9  6.6  0.5
2  8.5  9.4  0.7  2.3  1.3
3  9.5  9.6  1.8  1.1  0.3
4  10.1  10.8  2.3  0.8  0.3
5  11.1  9.4  5.1  0.1  0.0
total  9.4  10.2  1.8  2.6  0.6
Urban
Net Quintile
1  27.8  13.0  4.6  2.5  0.0
2  17.3  8.9  2.6  0.0  0.0
3  27.0  9.2  2.7  2.8  0.0
4  18.6  7.4  4.1  1.2  0.0
5  15.8  5.9  6.0  0.3  0.2
total  18.3  7.1  4.9  0.8  0.1
Source: 1998  VNLSS
Note: The rural/urban breakdown follows the urban92  definition.  Individuals  are ranked into national
population  quintiles based on household per capita expenditures net of half of transfers receipts.
37Table 3: Total spending on social welfare in 1998 as reported in VNLSS by urban,
rural and national ('000 Dongs)
Rural  Urban  Total
Social insurance:
total amount  1,458,655.0  1,443,274.0  2,901,929.0
% of total  50.3  49.7  100
Social subsidies:
total amount  404,762.6  117,436.0  522,198.6
% of total  77.5  22.5  100
Education scolarship:
total amount  40,680.61  46,779.39  87,460.0
% oftotal  46.5  53.5  100
Poverty alleviation Fund:
total amount  26,137.04  9,613.08  35,750.12
%of total  73.1  26.9  100
NGO Funds:
total amount  11,431.44  3,044.012  14,475.452
% of total  79.0  21.0  100
Total social income:
total amount  1,941,667.0  1,620,147.0  3,561,814.0
% of total  54.5  45.5  100
%of poor  94  6  100
% of population  78  22  100
Sample Observations  4,381  1,618  5,999
Note: Dong amounts are in thousands of 1998 Dongs and equal the weighted  sums of money
amounts received by households as reported in the  1998 VNLSS.
38Table 4: Incidence of school  fee exemptions  (% ofpopulation)
National  % of population with  Reason  for fee exemption  (%):
opulation  fee exemption:
Net Quintile  partial  total  either  disabled/  ethnic  poor  remote or  parent is disabled
orphan  minority  mountainous area  soldier or cadre
partial  total  partial  total  partial  total  partial  total  partial  total
1  3.2  3.8  7.0  0.6  1.6  8.6  37.9  12.7  17.4  24.8  31.3  8.8  3.6
2  3.7  2.2  5.9  2.1  2.3  10.7  15.9  11.0  27.9  22.5  36.1  11.9  4.0
3  4.3  1.4  5.7  0.4  0  5.2  14.8  12.6  34.6  24.3  27.2  19.5  12.6
4  3.1  1.1  4.2  0.9  6.4  4.4  26.8  6.0  11.2  16.2  37.7  28.2  6.0
5  2.4  0.6  3.0  4.4  3.9  2.3  0  6.9  10.7  6.0  15.1  26.4  15.8
total  3.3  1.8  5.1  1.5  2.1  6.6  24.7  10.3  21.8  20.0  31.3  18.1  6.3
Rural
Net Quintile
1  3.2  3.8  7.1  0  1.6  8.9  38.7  11.2  15.9  25.6  31.9  9.1  3.4
2  3.8  2.3  6.1  2.2  2.4  11.3  17.1  10.1  22.5  23.7  38.8  12.6  4.3
3  4.4  1.4  5.8  0.4  0  6.1  15.0  9.8  27.7  28.1  32.2  20.5  14.9
4  3.5  1.2  4.7  1.1  3.6  4.0  28.5  3.4  6.6  19.2  45.0  28.6  7.2
5  3.8  0.6  4.4  0.5  0  2.9  0  4.8  16.3  6.7  36.4  19.1  0
total  3.7  2.1  5.8  0.9  1.7  7.3  27.1  8.6  18.6  22.8  35.2  17.1  5.7
Urban
Net Quintile
1  2.1  2.2  4.2  17.5  0  0  0  52.4  89.3  0  0  0  10.7
2  1.6  1.0  2.6  0  0  0  0  27.2  100  0  0  0  0
3  3.8  1.1  4.9  0  0  0  13.3  30.0  72.5  0  0  13.6  0
4  1.9  0.6  2.4  0  20.9  6.5  18.3  20.2  34.9  0  0  26.0  0
5  1.5  0.6  2.1  11.0  6.7  1.3  0  10.6  6.7  4.9  0  38.9  26.9
total  1.8  0.7  2.6  5.3  5.7  1.8  5.8  21.4  47.1  1.9  0  24.2  11.2
Source:  1998 VNLSS
Note: The rural/urban breakdown follows the urban92 definition. Individuals  are ranked into national population quintiles based on household per capita
expenditures net of half of transfers receipts. Some aggregation has been made across reasons given for receiving a fee exemption:  disabled  and orphan; ethnic
minority and boarding student in minority area;  parent  is deceased soldier, seriously wounded soldier or disabled govermnent cadre;  the remainder includes
parent is farmer and 'other'.
39Table 5: Incidence of household contributions (dongs peryear  per capita and as a percent  of  household  per capita expenditures)
National  Laborfund  Local security fund  Associations  Total payments
population
Dongs per  % of population  Dongs per  % of population  Dongs per  % of population  Dongs per  as % of h'hold
Net Quintile:  capita  with payments  capita  with payments  capita  with payments  capita  expenditures
1  13,251  72.3  852  53.6  902  38.9  15,005  1.3
2  16,134  70.1  1,156  52.8  1,206  44.3  18,496  1.1
3  15,355  65.3  1,450  56.7  2,030  49.3  18,835  0.8
4  14,726  61.4  1,999  57.6  2,538  56.9  19,263  0.6
5  9,546  49.8  5,239  73.1  7,987  66.5  22,773  0.4
total  13,803  63.8  2,140  58.8  2,933  51.2  18,875  0.9
Rural
Net Quintile:
1  13,699  74.2  827  53.4  870  38.8  15,396  1.3
2  16,960  72.9  1,130  52.2  1,222  44.9  19,312  1.1
3  16,691  69.3  1,321  54.5  1,979  49.3  19,991  0.9
4  16,776  65.9  1,576  52.5  2,551  57.0  20,903  0.7
5  13,892  61.6  2,437  59.0  5,737  65.9  22,066  0.4
total  15,750  69.9  1,323  53.8  2,038  49.0  29,111  1.0
Urban
Net Quintile:
1  2,120  24.6  1,480  59.6  1,694  40.3  5,294  0.3
2  5,155  33.2  1,508  61.0  985  36.9  7,648  0.4
3  5,553  35.8  2,396  73.1  2,407  49.7  10,357  0.4
4  7,952  46.5  3,396  74.5  2,494  56.5  13,842  0.4
5  6,444  41.4  7,240  83.1  9,593  67.0  23,277  0.3
total  6,431  40.7  5,231  77.7  6,320  59.7  17,981  0.4
Source:  1998 VNLSS
Note:  The rural/urban breakdown follows the urban92 definition.  Individuals are ranked into national population  quintiles based on household per capita
expenditures  net of half of transfers receipts. Dong amounts are self-reported household payments to local government or any of the numerous  associations (mass
organizations)  during the last year expressed on a per capita basis across the entire quintile population.  The value of contributions in labor time has been imputed
using values of 10,000 and 15,000 Dongs per day worked in rural and urban areas respectively, and added to cash contributions  to the labor fund.
40Table 6: Rural population by whether they live  in commune  with poverty and other
programs (%)
Programs:  % of total  % of poor  % of non-poor
Poverty alleviation  79.1  83.6  76.2
Employment generation  21.1  19.1  22.5
Environmentallclean  water  15.3  13.7  16.4
Public health  25.0  28.7  22.5
Infrastructure  development  49.5  52.7  47.3
Education and culture  18.9  18.7  19.1
Other project  7.6  7.8  7.5
Disaster relief  66.1  71.5  62.5
Recent infrastructure  investments  92.4  93.4  91.9
roads  50.5  45.8  53.6
electricity  28.1  26.9  28.8
irrigation  36.7  40.6  34.1
schools  58.9  52.8  63.0
health center  36.2  33.3  38.1
water sources  18.1  18.9  17.5
other  0.9  0.5  1.1
observations  4269  1439  2830
Source:  1998  VNLSS
Note: The table combines information from the household and commune data sets.  Rural is defined according to
urban 98. The questionnaire  asked for the first, second and third kinds of govenmuent  or other projects/programs
currently existing in the commune.  The table reports % of population  living in communes  where a kind of project
was listed either first, second or third.
Table 7: Small town population by whether they live in a commune with poverty and other
programs (%)
Programs:  % of total  % of poor  % of non-poor
Poverty alleviation  83.1  86.2  82.7
Employment generation  38.4  45.0  37.4
Environmental/clean  water  20.5  23.3  20.1
Public health  6.6  14.1  5.5
Infrastructure  development  22.5  24.2  22.3
Education and culture  26.5  20.0  27.5
Disaster relief  50.7  61.4  49.1
Recent infrastructure  investments  78.0  83.3  77.2
roads  67.6  78.5  65.9
electricity  21.3  17.2  21.9
irrigation  12.7  18.2  11.8
schools  57.7  62.8  57.0
health center  23.3  20.6  23.7
water sources  27.2  26.9  27.2
observations  581  59  522
Source:  1998 VNLSS
Note: The table combines information from the household and commune data sets. The questionnaire asked for the
first, second and third kinds of govemment or other projects/programs  currently existing in the conmmune.  The table
reports % of population living in communes where a kind of project was listed either first, second or third.
41Table 8: Changes in incidence  over time
1992 social transfers  1998 social transfers  % increase in social
dongs per  % of h'hold  % of population  dongs per  % of h'hold  % of population
capita  expenditures  capita  expenditures
1992 Net quintile:
1  34,330  4.8  22.1 (775)  76,197  5.8  16.3 (775)  122.0
2  39,166  3.4  19.7 (830)  90,452  5.0  17.0 (829)  131.0
3  43,492  2.9  21.7 (850)  101,858  5.5  21.2 (850)  134.2
4  54,532  2.8  23.4 (895)  130,822  5.4  21.6 (891)  139.9
5  85,654  2.5  24.2 (958)  184,128  0.6  23.2 (958)  115.0
Total  51,443  3.3  22.2 (4305)  116,641  4.5  19.8 (4303)  126.7
Mean net quintile:
1  35,041  4.6  24.2 (740)  80,468  7.1  16.5 (740)  129.6
2  32,952  2.8  19.4 (809)  78,878  5.1  17.9 (809)  139.4
3  50,290  3.6  21.3 (872)  117,442  6.0  22.2 (872)  133.5
4  58,657  3.0  23.8 (924)  139,395  5.5  20.5 (924)  137.6
5  77,257  2.5  22.5 (960)  166,996  1.5  22.0 (958)  116.2
Total  51,443  3.3  22.2 (4305)  116,641  4.5  19.8 (4303)  126.7
1998 Net quintile:
1  38,652  4.1  23.0 (735)  91,545  3.2  17.6 (735)  136.8
2  35,299  3.1  21.8 (797)  89,965  5.8  18.1  (797)  154.9
3  51,934  3.5  22.7(879)  114,218  5.6  22.3(879)  119.9
4  50,131  3.0  21.0 (929)  116,325  4.3  19.3 (929)  132.0
5  76,857  2.9  22.6 (965)  171,121  3.4  21.8 (963)  122.7
Total  51,443  3.3  22.2 (4305)  116,641  4.5  19.8 (4303)  126.7
Source: van de Walle (2001) using the  1993 and 1998  VNLSSs.
Note: Quintiles are national population quintiles constructed based on per capita expenditures net of half of social transfers.  The number of sample households in
each quintile  are given in parentheses.  Dong amounts are expressed on a per capita basis across the quintile populations
42Table 9: The incidence of changes in transfers by initial consumption and changes in
consumption  over time
Fall in  Consumption  Large rise in
consumption  stayed the same  consumption
Low initial  34%  27%  27%
consumption  111,901  246,476  241,658
80  506  848
Middle initial  32%  30%  30%
consumption  408,469  251,619  296,513
240  422  772
High initial  33%  36%  32%
consumption  481,618  343,329  367,991
496  221  720
Source:  van de Walle (2001) using the 1993  and 1998 VNLSSs.
Note:  The population is ranked into three equal groups based on  1992/93 per capita expenditures  net of half of
transfers and cross-tabbed  against the level of their change in consumption over time net of half the change in
transfers. The first number gives the percentage of households in the cell who received transfers  in 1998.  The
second number gives the per capita  amount of the change in transfers received by those with positive receipts only.
The final number gives the number of households in the cell.  Changes in transfers refer to changes in amounts
received from social insurance, social subsidies and school scholarships.
Table 10: The baseline discreet joint distribution
1998
1993  Poor  Non-poor  total
Poor  33.54%  26.58%  60.12
(55.78)  (44.22)  100
Non-poor  4.84%  35.04%  39.88
(12.14)  (87.86)  100
total  38.38  61.62  100
Source:  van de Walle (2001) using the 1993  and 1998 VNLSSs.
Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on actual per capita expenditures  at each date and
cross-tabbed. The first number in each cell gives the percentage of total population who were in that row's poverty
group in 1993 and that column's group  in 1998.  The number in parentheses  inside the table gives the proportion of
each row's population that is in each column's group in 1998 or the transition probability.
43Table  11: Joint distribution without transfers
PROT= 0.31(0.66);  PROM= 0.70(0.74)
1998
1993  Poor  Non-poor  total
Poor  35.21%  25.88%  61.09
(57.63)  (42.37)  100
Non-poor  5.15%  33.76%  38.91
(13.24)  (86.76)  100
total  40.36  59.64  100
Source:  van de Walle (2001)  using the  1993  and 1998 VNLSSs.
Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on their simulated without transfer per capita
expenditures  (minus  .5*transfers) at each date and cross-tabbed.  z-scores in parentheses outside the table; critical
values:  1.96 (2.58)  at the 5% (1%) level.
Table 12: No change in transfers between  1993 and 1998
PROT= 0.36(0.76);  PROM=0.69(0.73)
1998
1993  Poor  Non-poor  total
Poor  34.23%  25.89%  60.12
(56.94)  (43.06)  100
Non-poor  5.19%  34.69%  39.88
(13.02)  (86.98)  100
total  39.43  60.57  100
Source:  van de Walle (2001) using the  1993 and  1998 VNLSSs.
Note: The population  is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on actual per capita expenditures for 1993 and the
simulated  1998 distribution had there been no change in transfers (per capita expenditures in 1998 minus .5 of the
change in transfers) and cross-tabbed.  z-scores in parentheses  outside the table; critical values:  1.96 (2.58) at the 5%
(1%) level.
44Table 13: Actual  1998 distribution versus uniform allocation  of 1998 transfers
1998  simulated
1998 actual  Poor  Non-poor  total  actual
Poor  35.54%  2.83%  38.38
(92.61)  (7.39)  100
Non-poor  1.54%  60.09%  61.62
(2.49)  (97.51)  100
total simulated  37.08  62.92  100
Source: van de Walle (2001)  using the 1998 VNLSS.
Note:  The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on actual per capita expenditures  for  1998 and the
simulated  1998 distribution had the five transfers identifiable  in 1998  been distributed uniformly across individuals,
and cross-tabbed.
Table  14: Actual  1998 distribution versus  1998 transfers targeted on equal per capita basis
to the poor
1998 simulated
1998 actual  Poor  Non-poor  total  actual
Poor  31.72%  6.66%  38.38
(82.66)  (17.34)  100
Non-poor  1.98%  59.64%  61.62
(3.21)  (96.79)  100
total simulated  33.70  66.30  100
Source: van de Walle (2001)  using the  1998 VNLSS.
Note:  The population is  ranked into poor, non-poor groups based on actual per capita expenditures  for 1998  and the
simulated  1998 distribution had the five transfers identifiable  in 1998 been distributed per capita only to the poor
and cross-tabbed.
Table  15: The incidence  of proportionate changes  in social  incomes
1998
1993  Poor  Non-poor
Poor  102%  189%
Non-poor  54%  125%
Source: van de Walle (2001)  using the 1993  and 1998 VNLSSs.
Note: The population is ranked into poor, non-poor groups  based on their actual per capita expenditures  at each date
and cross-tabbed.  The numbers give  the percentage change  in the three transfers between the dates.
45Table 16: Incidence of poverty related programs and beneficiaries  by rural poor, middle
and rich communes
% commune households who received:
Communes  Subsidized  School  fee  Hospital fee  Tax  Trainingb  Disaster
credit  exemptions  exemptions  exemptions'  relief
Poor  19.4  13.1  13.6  13.4  1.1  8.2
Middle  12.6  6.8  2.1  5.4  0.9  4.0
Rich  11.4  4.8  4.0  7.0  4.0  1.8
Total  14.6  8.3  6.7  8.8  1.9  4.7
% communes withfollowing  programs:
Poverty  Development  Education/  Health/public  Employm't  Environm't  other
alleviation  investmentsc  culture  health  generation  /clean water
Poor  88.5  53.9  25.0  30.8  19.2  9.6  7.7
Middle  76.9  42.3  15.4  23.1  19.2  19.2  3.9
Rich  71.2  36.5  26.9  9.6  32.7  21.2  7.7
Total  78.8  44.2  22.4  21.2  23.7  16.7  6.4
Source:  1998 VNLSS
Note:  Commnunes are ranked into three equal groups based on the mean per capita expenditures  net of half of social
incomes of their population.  All the other information is based on the commune level data.
a: Refers to exemption or reduction of production/business  taxes; b: Refers to occupational and agricultural
technology training;  c: refers to economic and infrastructure  development investmnents.
Table 17:  Incidence of social transfers  across the rural population by terciles and poor,
middle or rich commune (% ofpopulation)
Percent population benefitingfrom following household levelfunds:
Population  Social  Social  Poverty  NGO  Education  Total
terciles  insurance  subsidies  alleviation  scholarships
Poorest communes
1  (968)  7.6  10.2  6.7  0.7  0.9  23.4
2  (542)  10.7  8.5  2.4  0.7  2.3  21.6
3  (150)  12.2  4.3  3.0  0  3.4  22.3
total (1660)  8.8  9.5  5.1  0.7  1.5  22.8
Middle Communes
1  (405)  11.9  12.3  1.3  1.5  0.7  25.3
2  (741)  9.0  12.3  0.5  0.5  1.5  21.8
3  (489)  7.8  13.4  0  0  2.6  21.6
total (1635)  9.5  12.6  0.6  0.7  1.5  22.8
Richest communes
1  (149)  8.7  6.9  3.1  0  2.7  18.4
2  (479)  14.9  7.4  0.7  0.2  1.7  21.2
3  (927)  12.3  6.5  0.2  0  4.2  19.2
total (1555)  12.8  6.8  0.7  0.1  3.2  19.8
Source:  1998 VNLSS
Note: Communes are ranked into three equal groups based on the mean per capita expenditures  net of half of social
incomes of their population. The rural population is ranked into population terciles.  The number of sample
households in each tercile is given in parentheses.
46Table 18: Incidence  of social transfers across the rural population by terciles and poor,
middle or rich commune  (dongs per year per capita and as a percent of  household  per capita
expenditures)
Per capita dongs received by rural  populationfromfollowingfunds:
Population  Social  Social  Poverty  NGO  Education  Total  % of h'hold
terciles  insurance  subsidies  alleviation  scholarships  expenditures
Poorest communes
1  (968)  45,122  18,461  2,132  1,204  1,339  68,257  4.3
2  (542)  65,356  21,537  1,009  366  1,646  89,915  3.5
3  (150)  94,177  8,802  210  0  4,735  107,924  2.7
total (1660)  54,310  18,797  1,672  874  1,643  77,296  3.9
Middle  Communes
1  (405)  88,919  22,820  2,979  384  447  115,548  6.2
2  (741)  73,515  17,495  746  447  1,369  93,572  3.5
3  (489)  75,394  27,084  0  0  2,859  105,337  2.5
total (1635)  78,485  21,462  1,210  316  1,475  102,948  4.0
Richest communes
1  (149)  141,927  17,322  890  0  788  160,927  7.1
2  (479)  146,022  17,052  491  634  1,839  166,038  5.6
3  (927)  126,358  15,486  83  0  6,745  148,672  3.1
total (1555)  134,507  16,202  306  207  4,480  155,701  4.4
Source:  1998 VNLSS
Note:  Communes are ranked into three equal groups based on the mean per capita expenditures  net of half of social
incomes of their population.  The rural population is ranked into population terciles.  The number of sample
households in each tercile is given in parentheses.
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